Liquidity, Interest Rates and Output by Shouyong Shi







This paper integrates limited participation into monetary search theory to analyze the
liquidity eﬀects of open market operations. The centralized bonds market features limited
participation and shocks to government bond sales, while the decentralized goods market
features bilateral matches. Unmatured bonds can be used together with money to purchase
goods in a fraction of matches, but in other matches a legal restriction forbids the use of
bonds as the means of payments. In this economy, a shock to bond sales has two distinct
liquidity eﬀects. One is the immediate liquidity eﬀect on the bond price and the nominal
interest rate. The other is a liquidity eﬀect in the goods market starting one period later, i.e.,
the eﬀect on the amount of unmatured bonds circulating in the goods market. Thus, even
independent shocks can aﬀect the household’s money allocation between the two markets,
aﬀect real output and the term structure of interest rates, and cause nominal interest rates
to be serially correlated. I establish the existence of the equilibrium and, with numerical
examples, examine equilibrium properties.
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This paper integrates goods market search into a model with limited participation to analyze
the liquidity eﬀect of open market operations. Limited participation refers to the assumption
that the participants in the bonds market cannot adjust their money holdings immediately to
shocks to government bond sales. In an inﬂuential paper, Lucas (1990) has shown that limited
participation enables open market operations to generate a liquidity eﬀect, i.e., positive shocks
to bond sales depress the bond price and drive up the nominal interest rate while negative shocks
reduce the nominal interest rate. A central assumption in his model is that all transactions are
constrained by cash. In this paper, I will replace the Walrasian goods market in his model by a
decentralized search market in order to support a role for money and to relax the cash-in-advance
constraint in the goods market.
One motivation for this analysis is to provide a microfoundation for the role of money in
Lucas’s analysis. As Wallace (2001) forcefully argued, cash-in-advance constraints are not suitable
for monetary theory and policy analysis. Search theory of money originated in Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) provides a microfoundation for money, but so far the models based on it are not
tractable for analyzing nominal bonds, not mentioning the liquidity eﬀect arising from stochastic
bond sales. The current paper is an attempt to construct such a tractable model. Another
motivation is that relaxing the cash-in-advance constraint in the goods market might improve
the empirical performance of limited participation models. There is convincing evidence that
the correlation between nominal interest rates and money is negative for very narrow monetary
aggregates but positive for broad aggregates (see Chari et al. 1995). One interpretation of this
evidence is that the cash-in-advance constraint does not apply in some transactions.
The economy in this paper has a bonds market and a goods market, which operate separately
in each period. The bonds market is centralized and functions in exactly the same way as in
Lucas’s model. That is, the government issues nominal bonds at the market price and accepts
only money as payments. The amount of new bonds is stochastic, which is the only aggregate
uncertainty in the economy. This shock is realized after the households have already allocated
the assets between the markets, and hence the familiar liquidity eﬀect arises in the bonds market.
The goods market is decentralized, where agents meet randomly and determine how much
to trade bilaterally. Money can be used in all trades for goods, but bonds can only be used
in a fraction of trades called unrestricted trades. In the other fraction g ∈ (0,1) of matches,
which are called restricted trades, a legal restriction forbids the use of bonds as the means of
payments for goods. With this legal restriction, bonds are redeemed immediately after they
mature, but unmatured bonds can circulate as an imperfect substitute for money. The imperfect
substitutability generates an additional discount on long-term bonds, relative to short-term bonds.
As this additional discount responds to open market operations, the term structure of interest
1rates varies. I set the bonds’ maturity to be two periods — the shortest length that allows bonds
to circulate in the goods market before maturity.
Allowing unmatured bonds to purchase a subset of goods is a crude way to capture the idea
that an actual economy has more than cash as the means of payments. However, it may not
be useful to insist on the literal interpretation that unmatured bonds act directly as a medium
of exchange. In reality, bonds are a large part of money market checking accounts that the
households have in ﬁnancial institutions, on which checks can be written to pay for goods.
When unmatured bonds circulate in the goods market, open market operations generate a
delayed liquidity eﬀect in the goods market, in addition to the immediate liquidity eﬀect in the
bonds market. In particular, a high shock to bond sales in the previous period increases the
quantity of unmatured bonds circulating in the current goods market. The additional bonds
provide liquidity to the buyers who are in unrestricted trades. Thus, in addition to changing
the price level, shocks to bond sales in the previous period change the current dispersion of
real quantities of goods produced and traded in unrestricted matches versus restricted matches.
This liquidity eﬀect of unmatured bonds in the goods market induces a number of new features
regarding output, interest rates and the term structure.
Before examining these features, I will devote a large part of this paper to establishing the
existence of the equilibrium. Although the existence proof follows the general route used by
Lucas (1990), the details necessarily diﬀer for the following reasons. First, the goods market
here is non-Walrasian, and so prices are determined bilaterally. Second, output is determined
endogenously in the equilibrium, rather than being given by endowments. Third, there are two
types of trades in the goods market — the restricted trades and unrestricted trades — and so prices
are diﬀerent in the two types of trades.
Because this paper attempts to integrate limited participation into search models of money,
it is naturally related to both literatures. The literature on limited participation is large and a
reference list can be found in Christiano et al. (1999). The goods market in this literature is
centralized, Walrasian, and with cash-in-advance constraints. The literature on search models of
money is also sizable, but only a few are tractable enough to incorporate elements such as money
growth and nominal bonds. The precursors to the current paper, Shi (2002, 2003), incorporate
such elements in deterministic environments.
2. A Search Economy with Legal Restrictions
In this section I describe an economy with a legal restriction in the goods market, analyze indi-
viduals’ decisions, and deﬁne the equilibrium.
22.1. Households, Matches, and Markets
The economy has discrete time and many types of households. The number of households in each
type is large and normalized to one. The households in each type are specialized in producing a
speciﬁc good, which they do not consume, and exchange for consumption goods in the market.
Goods are perishable between periods. The utility of consumption is u(.) for consumption goods
and 0 for other goods. The cost (disutility) of production is ψ(.). The utility function satisﬁes
u0 > 0a n du00 ≤ 0. The cost function satisﬁes ψ(0) = 0, ψ0 > 0a n dψ00 > 0. Moreover,
u0(0) = ∞ > ψ0(0) and u0(∞) < ψ0(∞). To simplify the algebra, I will use the form ψ(q)=ψ0qΨ,
where Ψ > 1a n dψ0 > 0.
Each household consists of a large number of members normalized to one. A fraction σ of
these members are sellers and the remaining are buyers, where σ ∈ (0,1). A seller produces
and sells goods, and a buyer purchases goods for consumption. The members share consumption
and regard the household’s utility function as the common objective. As a result, individual
matching risks are smoothed out within each household, and the distribution of asset holdings
across households is degenerate. This degeneracy maintains tractability as it enables me to focus
on the equilibrium that is symmetric across households.1
There are two assets in the economy. One is money and the other is nominal bonds issued by
the government. These assets can be stored without cost. Both are intrinsically worthless; i.e.,
they do not yield direct utility or facilitate production. Nominal bonds are default-free and their
maturity is two periods. A bond in its second period is called an unmatured bond. Each bond
can be redeemed for one unit of money at, and only at, maturity.2
Let me describe the goods market ﬁrst. In this market agents meet their trading partners
bilaterally and randomly. Of interest are trade matches, in which the buyer likes the seller’s
goods. These matches are the only meetings in which a trade can take place. A buyer encounters
at r a d em a t c ha tr a t eασ,a n das e l l e ra tr a t eα(1 − σ), where α < 1. The total number of
trades matches that all buyers (or sellers) of a household have in a period is ασ(1 − σ). There
is no chance for a double coincidence of wants to support barter, nor public record-keeping of
transactions to support credit trades. As a result, every trade entails a medium of exchange,
which may be money or unmatured bonds.
A legal restriction forbids the use of bonds as a means of payments for goods in a fraction
g ∈ (0,1) of matches. In these matches, money is the only means of payments. In other matches
the buyers can combine money and bonds to purchase goods. An example of how the legal
1The assumption of large households, used by Shi (1997, 1999), is a modelling device extended from Lucas
(1990). Lagos and Wright (2001) use a diﬀerent set of assumptions to achieve essentially the same purpose of
smoothing individual matching risks.
2One can allow bonds past the maturity to be redeemed. As shown in Shi (2002), however, no agent in the
described environment would choose to hold bonds beyond maturity. Hence, matured bonds do not circulate in
the goods market.
3restriction is enforced, which I do not explicitly model here, is that a fraction g of all agents in
the economy are government agents who accept only money as payments. A trade is called a
restricted trade if the legal restriction is imposed and an unrestricted trade otherwise.
I model the legal restriction as a matching shock in the following way: All members of a
household will be located in restricted matches with probability g and all in unrestricted matches
with probability 1 − g. These shocks are independent across households and over time. Thus, a
speciﬁc household experiences either restricted or unrestricted trades in a period, but not both.
Among all households, a fraction g are in restricted matches and a fraction (1−g) in unrestricted
matches. This formulation simpliﬁes the analysis.3
In contrast to the goods market, the bonds market has no transaction cost and trades take
zero measure of agents. In this market, the government conducts open market operations by
selling new two-period bonds at the competitive price. As in Lucas (1990), the government only
accepts money as payments for the purchase. However, agents can bring unmatured bonds into
the bonds market, sell them to other households for money, and then use the receipt to purchase
new bonds, although the net amount of such transactions is zero in a symmetric equilibrium.
The amount of newly issued bonds is stochastic, which is the only aggregate uncertainty in the
economy. Let M be the average amount of money holdings per household. The amount of newly
issued bonds is zM,w h e r ez is a random variable following a Markov process. The realizations of
z lie in a compact set Z, with a lower bound zL > 0 and an upper bound zH < ∞. The transition
probabilities of z are described by a function Φ(dz,z−1), where the subscript −1 indicates the
previous period. Assume that Φ has the Feller property (i.e., f : Z×Z → R is continuous implies
R
f(z,z−1)Φ(dz,z−1) is continuous).
To focus on “pure” liquidity eﬀects, I maintain Lucas’s assumption that the money stock
grows at a constant rate γ;i . e . ,M = γM−1. This is made possible by lump-sum monetary
transfers that eliminate the eﬀect of the shock z on money growth.
2.2. Timing of Events
Let me clarify three pieces of notation. First, like Lucas (1990), I normalize nominal quantities
by the aggregate money holding per household, M. Second, I suppress the generic time subscript
t,d e n o t i n gt ± j as ±j for j ≥ 1. Third, I pick an arbitrary household as the representative
household and use lower-case letters to denote the decisions of this household. The corresponding
capital-case letters denote other households’ decisions or aggregate variables.
Figure 1 depicts the timing of events in each period. At the beginning of the period the
household redeems bonds that were issued two periods ago and receives a lump-sum monetary
transfer, L. After these events, the household’s holding of money (divided by M)i sm e a s u r e da s
3The formulation is not critical. In a deterministic version of the current model (Shi 2003), I explored a diﬀerent
formulation where a household experiences both restricted and unrestricted trades in each period.
4m, and of unmatured bonds as b.
Then, the household chooses a fraction of money, a, and a fraction of unmatured bonds, l,
that will be taken to the goods market. This part of the assets the household divides evenly
among the buyers; so, each buyer carries am/(1 − σ) units of money and lb/(1 − σ) units of
unmatured bonds. The household takes the remaining assets to the bonds market. At the time
of choosing the portfolio divisions (a,l), the household also chooses the quantities of goods and
money in a trade. These quantities are contingent on whether the household members will be
located in restricted or unrestricted trades. The quantities are (qg,x g) for a restricted trade and






















Figure 1 Timing of events in a period
Next, the two markets open simultaneously and separately. In the goods market, the match-
ing shock implied by the legal restriction is realized, and agents trade according to the quantities
(qg,x g)a n d( qn,x n) prescribed by the household. In the bonds market, the shock (z)t og o v e r n -
ment bond sales occurs. Let d denote the amount of new bonds that the household purchases
and bu the amount of unmatured bonds that the household carries out of the bonds market when
the market closes. The price of two-period bonds is S and of unmatured bonds Su.
Then, the markets close and agents go home. The household pools the receipts from the
trades and allocates consumption evenly among all members. After consumption, time proceeds
to the next period.
With the above timing, one-period bonds do not have a chance to circulate in the goods market
before maturity. Once matured, bonds are redeemed immediately, because it is not optimal to
hold bonds beyond maturity, even though they can be used as a means of payments in a fraction of
trades (see Shi 2002). Thus, only unmatured long-term bonds can circulate in the goods market.
The temporary separation between the bonds market and the goods market implies that there
is an opportunity cost for bringing assets into the bonds market. Also, because the household
must choose the portfolio divisions (a,l) before the current state z is realized, these decisions can
depend on the past shock z−1 but not on the current shock z. In contrast, the household chooses
the amounts of bonds to purchase after observing the current state z.T h u s ,d and bu can depend
on z,a sw e l la so nz−1. Similarly, bonds prices (S,Su) depend on both z and z−1.
52.3. Quantities of Trade in the Goods Market
The household chooses the quantities of money and goods in each trade match. To describe
these choices, let v(m,b,z−1) be the household’s value function, given the realization of the
previous period’s shock z−1 and the asset holdings (m,b) at the beginning of the current period
after redeeming bonds and receiving monetary transfers. The discount factor is β ∈ (0,1). Let
ωm(z−1) be the expected shadow value of next period’s money discounted to the current period,
where the expectation is calculated before observing the current shock z. Similarly, let ωb(z−1)





vi(m+1,b +1,z)Φ(dz,z−1),i = m,b, (2.1)
where vm = ∂v(m,b)/∂m and vb = ∂v(m,b)/∂b. Notice that the discounting involves the money
growth rate γ, because the variables m and b are normalized by the aggregate money stock which
grows over time at rate γ. The expected values, ωm and ωb, are computed before the current
shock z is realized, in order to make them relevant for the portfolio decisions in the current period.
Other households’ expected value of future money is Ωm and of future unmatured bonds Ωb.
In a trade match, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. The oﬀer speciﬁes the quantity of
goods that the buyer asks the seller to supply, q, and the quantity of assets that the buyer gives,
x. These quantities are (qg,x g) in a restricted trade and (qn,x n) in an unrestricted trade. In an
unrestricted trade, it is not necessary to specify the division of the amount xn into money and
unmatured bonds, because the two assets are equivalent to each other to the seller who receives
the assets as payments: Upon exiting from the trade, the seller will not have the opportunity to
use the assets to purchase goods in the current period and, at the beginning of next period, the
received bonds mature and can be redeemed for money at par.4
Because of the assumption that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, the quantities
(qi,x i) yields zero surplus for the seller. Thus,
xi(z−1)=
ψ(qi(z−1))
Ωm , i = n,g. (2.2)
Also, the buyer is constrained by the sum of money and unmatured bonds in an unrestricted









When an asset constraint binds, I say that the asset yields liquidity service in the goods market.
Similarly, money may generate liquidity in the bonds market.
4For the same reason, a trade in the goods market between a money holder and a bond holder is inconsequential,
and so it is omitted here.
62.4. A Household’s Decision Problem
In a typical period, the household’s choices are the portfolio division, (a,l), the quantities of
trade, (qn,x n,qg,x g), the amount of new bonds to purchase, d, the amount of unmatured bonds
exiting the bonds market with, bu, consumption, (cn,c g), future money holdings, m+1,a n df u t u r e
holdings of unmatured bonds, b+1. Recall that the decisions (a,l,q,x,c) are functions of the
previous period’s state z−1, but (d,bu) can depend on the current state z as well. In principle,
future money holdings depend on whether the household members are all located in restricted or




Taking other households’ decisions and aggregate variables as given, the representative house-

























The constraints are as follows:
(i) the constraints in the goods market, (2.2) — (2.4), and
ci(z−1)=ασ(1 − σ)qi(z−1), i = n,g;( 2 . 5 )
(ii) the constraints in the bonds market: bu(z) ≥ 0a n d
S(z,z−1)d(z,z−1) ≤ [1 − a(z−1)]m + Su(z,z−1){[1 − l(z−1)]b − bu(z,z−1)};( 2 . 6 )












+[ l(z−1)b + bu(z,z−1)] + L+1
ª
,i = g,n. (2.8)
(iv) and other constraints: 0 ≤ a(z−1) ≤ 1a n d0≤ l(z−1) ≤ 1.
The objective function in the above problem contains two groups of terms, one for the case
where the household’s members are located in restricted matches and the other for the case
in unrestricted matches.5 The outer maximization determines the choices (a,l,q,x,c), which are
made before the realization of the shock z. The inner maximization determines the choices (d,bu),
which maximize the future value function for each realization of z.
5The implicit assumption here is that the goods in a restricted trade yield the same marginal utility as the
goods in an unrestricted trade. For a relaxation of this assumption, see Shi (2003).
7The constraints in (i) are explained before, while the constraints in (iv) are self-explanatory.
There are two constraints in the bonds market, as in (ii). First, because the government does
not buy back unmatured bonds, the household cannot hold a negative amount of unmatured
bonds. Second, the household must ﬁnance the purchase of new bonds by the assets it brings
into the bonds market, as (2.6) requires. The last term in (2.6) is the receipt of money that the
household obtains by selling some of the unmatured bonds it brought to the bonds market.
In (iii), the law of motion of unmatured bonds states that the amount of unmatured bonds at
the beginning of the next period is equal to the amount of new bonds purchased in the current
period. The factor 1/γ appears on the right-hand side of (2.7) because b+1 is normalized by
future money stock M+1 while d by M.
To explain the law of motion of money, (2.8), recall that the household’s money holding is
measured at the time immediately after receiving monetary transfers and redeeming matured
bonds (see Figure 1). Between two adjacent points of time of this measurement, money holdings
can change as a result of the following transactions: purchasing newly issued bonds, selling
unmatured bonds in the bonds market, selling and buying goods, redeeming matured bonds and
receiving the monetary transfer next period. The terms following m on the right-hand side of
(2.8) list the net changes in money holdings from these ﬁve types of transactions. Again, the
factor 1/γ appears on the right-hand side because of the normalization of variables.
To characterize optimal decisions, let ρ(z,z−1) be the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint
in the bonds market, (2.6). Let λn(z−1) be the multiplier of the asset constraint in an unrestricted
trade, (2.3), and λg(z−1) the multiplier of the asset constraint in a restricted trade, (2.4). To
simplify the equations, multiply λn by ασ(1 − σ)(1 − g)a n dλg by ασ(1 − σ)g. Incorporating
these constraints and use (2.2) to eliminate x, I have the following modiﬁed objective function:




































+1,b +1,z)+β(1 − g)v(mn
+1,b +1,z)
+ρ(z,z−1){[1 − a(z−1)]m + Su(z,z−1)[(1− l(z−1))b − bu(z)] − S(z,z−1)d(z,z−1)}.
Notice that Xi = xi in all symmetric equilibria, and so m
g
+1 = mn
+1. The superscripts (g,n)
on m will then be suppressed. In the following conditions for optimal choices, I also suppress the
dependence of (a,l,q,x,c,λ)o nz−1 and the dependence of (d,bu,S,Su,ρ)o n( z,z−1).





Ωm ,i = n,g. (2.9)
8(ii) Portfolio divisions (a,l) and bonds market decisions (bu,d):
for a: ασ [(1 − g)λn + gλg]=
Z
ρΦ(dz,z−1); (2.10)






























In each of these conditions, the variable attains the lowest value in the speciﬁed domain if the
equality is replaced by “<”, and the highest value if “>”, where a,l ∈ [0,1] and d,bu ∈ [0,∞).
(iii) The envelope condition for m and b:
vm = ωm + aασ[(1 − g)λn + gλg]+( 1− a)
Z
ρΦ(dz,z−1); (2.14)








The condition (2.9) requires that the net gain to a buyer from asking for an additional amount
of goods be zero. By getting an additional unit of good, the household’s utility increases by u0(c).
The cost is to pay an additional amount ψ0(q)/Ωm of assets in order to induce the seller to trade
(see (2.2)). By giving an additional unit of asset, the buyer foregoes the discounted future value
of the asset, ωm, and causes the asset constraint in the trade to be more binding. Thus, (ωm+λ)
is the shadow cost of each additional unit of asset to the buyer’s household and the right-hand
side of (2.9) is the cost of getting an additional unit of good from the seller.
In (ii), (2.10) says that for the household to allocate money to both the goods market and
the bonds market, money must generate the same expected liquidity service in the two markets.
The liquidity services, derived from relaxing the money constraints in the markets, are λn and
λg in the goods market and ρ in the bonds market.
The condition (2.11) is a similar requirement on the allocation of unmatured bonds between
the two markets. If the household takes a unit of unmatured bond to the goods market, the bond
can generate liquidity services ασ(1−g)λn by relieving the asset constraints and will have a future
value
β
γvm+1 upon redemption. If the household instead takes the unit of unmatured bond to the
bonds market, the bond can be sold for Su units of money, which will generate liquidity service
ρ in the bonds market and will have a future value
β
γvm+1. Because the household must choose
9l before seeing the realization of z, it compares the expected values of allocating a marginal unit
of unmatured bonds to the two markets, and this comparison leads to (2.11).
The condition (2.12) speciﬁes the optimal demand for unmatured bonds in the bonds market.
The value of keeping a unit of unmatured bond for future redemption is the discounted future
value of one unit of money,
β






Su, as explained above. For the choice bu to be interior, these two values must be
equal to each other. The condition (2.13) is a similar requirement for the quantity of new bonds
purchased, except that the price and future value of a new bond are diﬀerent from those of an
unmatured bond. Notice that (2.12) and (2.13) apply to every realization of z.
Finally, the envelope conditions require the current value of each asset to be equal to the sum
of the expected future value of the asset and the expected liquidity service generated by the asset
in the current markets. Take the condition for money for example. The current value of money
is vm+1. The right-hand side of (2.14) consists of the expected future value of money, ωm,t h e
liquidity service generated by money in the current bonds market, ρ, and the liquidity service
generated by money in the current goods market, λ. The liquidity services in the two markets
are weighted by the division of money into the two markets.
2.5. Equilibrium Deﬁnition and Interest Rates
A (symmetric) monetary equilibrium consists of a value function v: R+ ×R+ ×Z → R, portfolio
division functions a,l: Z → [0,1], functions of trade quantities in matches qn,x n,qg,x g: Z → R+,
consumption function c: Z → R+, bonds purchase functions d,bu: Z × Z → R+, bonds price
functions S,Su: Z × Z → R++ such that
(i) Given other households’ choices and (m,b), the household’s choices solve (PH);
(ii) The choices are the same across households and, in particular, m =1 ;
(iii) The bonds market clears, i.e., d(z,z−1)=z and bu(z,z−1)=[ 1− l(z−1)]b for all
(z,z−1) ∈ Z × Z;
(iv) 0 < ωm(z),ωb(z) < ∞ for all z ∈ Z.
Part (i) of the deﬁnition requires that the household’s choices be optimal, given other house-
holds’ choices, and Part (ii) requires symmetry across households. In part (iii), the supply of new
bonds (normalized by M)i sz, and the supply of unmatured bonds is (1 − l)b. In part (iv), the
restriction that the value of each asset be positive is necessary for a meaningful examination of
the coexistence of money and bonds. The restriction that these values be bounded away from
inﬁnity is necessary for the ﬁrst-order conditions to characterize optimal decisions.
Moreover, I restrict attention to equilibria in which money serves as a medium of exchange
in the goods market in all states of the economy. This restriction requires a(z−1) > 0 for all
10z−1 ∈ Z. The restriction also requires that, for all z−1,a tl e a s to n eo fλn(z−1)a n dλg(z−1)b e
positive; otherwise money would be only a store of value.
By invoking equilibrium conditions, I can simplify some of the optimality conditions. First,
because d(z)=z ∈ (0,∞) in equilibrium, the optimal condition for d must hold as equality, as in
(2.13). Second, because m =1a n db = d−1/γ = z−1/γ in equilibrium, I can shorten the notation








, i = m,b. (2.16)





µi(z)Φ(dz,z−1),i = m,b. (2.17)
Third, for all S>0, the bonds market clearing conditions imply a<1. Under the restriction
a>0, then 0 <a<1, and the equality in (2.10) holds. The condition (2.14) can be simpliﬁed as
µm(z−1)=ωm(z−1)+ασ [(1 − g)λn(z−1)+gλg(z−1)]. (2.18)
Deﬁne the two-period (net) nominal interest rate as r = 1
S − 1. If money yields liquidity in
the bonds market (i.e., if ρ > 0), then (2.6) binds and S =( 1− a)/z. In this case, (2.13) implies
S<µ b(z)/µm(z). If ρ = 0, then (2.6) does not bind. In this case, S ≤ (1 − a)/z, and (2.13)
implies S = µb(z)/µm(z). Combining the two cases, I express the two-period bond price as































This shadow price may be zero for particular realizations of z, but the expected value of ρ(z,z−1)
over z must be positive for all z−1 ∈ Z, in order to satisfy the earlier restriction that at least one
of λg(z−1)a n dλn(z−1) be positive (see (2.10)).
The price of unmatured bonds in the bonds market, Su, depends on whether the household
takes all unmatured bonds to the goods market. If l = 1, the supply of and the demand for
unmatured bonds in the bonds market are both zero, in which case Su is indeterminate. If l<1,
11the supply of unmatured bonds in the bonds market is positive. In this case, the equality in







Unmatured bonds are discounted if ρ(z,z−1) > 0.
Although the price of unmatured bonds may be indeterminate, the price of newly issued
one-period bonds is determinate. If one-period bonds were issued, the price would obey (2.22)







The ratio µm/µb is the expected future discount on unmatured bonds. As shown later, µb(z) <
µm(z) in the equilibrium, because unmatured bonds are not perfect substitutes for money in the
goods market. Thus, there is a deeper discount on two-period bonds than on one-period bonds.
3. The Characterization of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be one of two cases, 0 ≤ l<1a n dl =1 .W h e nl = 1, the household takes
all unmatured bonds to the goods market and such bonds generate liquidity in a fraction g of
trades. In the case 0 ≤ l<1, unmatured bonds do not generate liquidity (at the margin) in the
goods market, i.e, λn = 0, although some unmatured bonds may still be used to buy goods.6
Money generates liquidity service in both cases. When λn = 0, money does not generate
liquidity service in an unrestricted trade, but it does in a restricted trade. This is because, when
λn =0 ,λg must be positive in order to satisfy the earlier restriction that at least one of λg and λn
be positive. When λn > 0, money generates liquidity services in both unrestricted and restricted
trades. In particular, λg > 0 because the buyer in a restricted trade has a smaller amount of asset
to use than in an unrestricted trade; if a buyer faces a binding asset constraint in an unrestricted
trade, then he must be even more severely constrained in a restricted trade.
The condition λn > 0i se q u i v a l e n tt ou0(cn) > ψ0(qn)( s e e( 2 . 9 )f o ri = n). Deﬁne Q0 as the
solution to the following equation:
u0 (ασ(1 − σ)Q0)=ψ0(Q0). (3.1)
Then, λn > 0i ﬀ qn <Q 0. Similarly, λg > 0i ﬀ qg <Q 0.
I will transform the equilibrium as a ﬁxed point of the assets’ value functions (µm,µ b,ωm)
and the money allocation function a. First, I express the above conditions for binding asset
6The proof for λ
n = 0 in this case is as follows. When 0 ≤ l<1, the optimality condition for l h o l d sa s“ ≤”;
That is, (2.11) holds as “≤”. Because b
u =( 1− l)b ∈ (0,∞)w h e n0≤ l<1, the equality in (2.12) holds, which
leads to (2.22). Substituting (2.22) into the inequality form of (2.11) yields λ
n ≤ 0. Thus, λ
n =0 .
12constraints as conditions on the shadow value of money. Intuitively, an asset constraint binds
in a trade if the value of assets used in that trade is low. In an unrestricted trade, the total
value of assets is am+lb
1−σ ωm, and the asset constraint binds iﬀ this value is less than ψ(Q0). This
binding asset constraint also implies l = 1, as discussed above. Since m =1a n db = z−1/γ in the










Clearly, w2 >w 1.
Second, I express the quantity of goods in a trade as a function of the expected value of money.
When the asset constraint does not bind in a trade (restricted or unrestricted), the quantity of
g o o d st r a d e di nam a t c hi sQ0, which is independent of the value of money. When the asset
constraint binds in an unrestricted trade, the buyer spends all his assets to buy goods. So, the








Similarly, when the asset constraint binds in a restricted trade, the quantity of goods in the trade







Clearly, Q2 <Q 1.
Third, I express the liquidity service that an asset generates in the goods market as a function
of the shadow value of money. When the asset constraint binds in a trade, the assets used in that
trade generate liquidity service. The total amount of liquidity services that unmatured bonds
generate over all trades is ασ(1−g)λn.W h e nλn > 0, I can substitute λn from (2.9) and compute
the bonds’ liquidity service as ωm(z−1)Fn,w h e r eFn is deﬁned as:
Fn(ωm;a,z−1)=ασ(1 − g)
·





When λn > 0, money also generates the above liquidity services in unrestricted trades. In
addition, money generates liquidity services in restricted trades. The total amount of such services








13The total amount of liquidity that money generates in the goods market is ασ[gλg +( 1− g)λn].





Fg(ωm;a)+Fn(ωm;a,z−1), if 0 < ωm ≤ w1
Fg(ωm;a), if w1 ≤ ωm ≤ w2
0, if ωm ≥ w2.
(3.8)
Now I can obtain the functional equations for (µm,µ b,ωm,a). The equation for µm comes
from rewriting (2.18) as:
µm(z−1)=ωm(z−1)[1+F(ωm(z−1);a(z−1),z −1)]. (3.9)
This is a functional equation for µm,s i n c eωm = O(µm). Similarly, the functional equation for
µb comes from rewriting (2.15) as follows:7
µb(z−1)=
(
ωm(z−1)[1+Fn(ωm(z−1);a(z−1),z −1)], if 0 < ωm ≤ w1
ωm(z−1), if ωm ≥ w1.
(3.10)







zµb(z), [1 − a(z−1)]µm(z)
o
Φ(dz,z−1). (3.11)
The strategy for determining the equilibrium is as follows. Start with an arbitrary continuous
function a(.) bounded in the interior of [0,1] and solve the ﬁxed point for µm from (3.9). Substitute
the solution into ωm = O(µm)t og e tωm and into (3.10) to get µb. Then, substitute (µm,µ b)
into the right-hand side of (3.11) to obtain a new function, denoted as Γa(z−1). The equilibrium
solution for a(.)s o l v e sa(z−1)=Γa(z−1). Once the functions (µm,µ b,ωm,a)a r ed e t e r m i n e d ,I
can recover the traded quantities of goods and consumption (output) through (3.4) and (3.5),
the bond price S through (2.19) and the nominal interest rate through (2.20). The fraction of
unmatured bonds taken to the goods market is l =1i fωm <w 1 and l ∈ [0,1) if ωm >w 1.8
The equilibrium requires ωm <w 2;o t h e r w i s e ,µm = ωm = O(µm), which would not have a
stationary solution for µm when γ > β. For all ωm <w 2, (3.9) and (3.10) imply that µm(z) >
µb(z) for all z. Thus, unmatured bonds are not perfect substitutes for money in the goods
market and, as (2.23) shows, this imperfect substitutability induces a deeper discount on two-
period bonds than on one-period bonds. Of course, the imperfect substitutability relies on the
existence of the legal restriction.
7The derivation is straightforward when ω
m <w 1 (i.e., when l =1 ) . W h e nω
m >w 1,0≤ l<1a n dλ
n =0 ,
as discussed above. Then b
u =( 1− l)b ∈ (0,∞), and so the equality in (2.12) holds. This equality and the fact
λ




m >w 1, the equilibrium is consistent with a range of values of l in [0,1). This indeterminacy of l
has no eﬀect on real variables, because unmatured bonds do not generate liquidity service at the margin. The
indeterminacy does not aﬀect the equilibrium value of a, either, and hence the bond price S and the corresponding
interest rate r do not depend on such indeterminacy.
144. A Special Case: Independent Shocks
Let me ﬁrst study the special case where the shocks to bond sales are independent over time. This
special case helps illustrating some key diﬀerences between the current model and Lucas’s (1990)
model. The equilibrium behaves diﬀerently depending on whether unmatured bonds generate
liquidity service in the goods market.
Consider ﬁrst the case where unmatured bonds do not generate liquidity service, i.e., where
ωm >w 1. Since only the money constraint binds in this case, the equilibrium behaves like that in
Lucas’s model. With independent shocks, the shadow values of assets (µm,µ b)a n dt h ef r a c t i o n
a are numbers, rather than functions. To solve for these constants, note that F = Fg in this
case. Also, ωm = O(µm)=
β
γµm. Then, (3.9) becomes Fg(ωm;a)=
γ
β − 1. Substituting Fg from
(3.7), this equation solves for the quantity of goods in a restricted trade, which is a constant.
Because the quantity of goods in an unrestricted trade is equal to the constant Q0 when ωm >w 1,
consumption and output are constant. Moreover, µb = ωm by (3.10), and so µb =
β
γµm.W i t h












This solves for the constant a under suitable conditions.9











A tightening open market operation, modelled as an increase in z, raises the interest rate when
z<(1 − a)
γ
β. This liquidity eﬀect in the bonds market does not translate into any eﬀect on real
activities. Nor does it aﬀect the additional discount on two-period bonds relative to one-period
bonds, which is γ/β − 1 (see (2.23)).
Continue the examination of the economy with independent shocks but consider the case
where unmatured bonds generate liquidity service, i.e., where 0 < ωm <w 1. This case of the
equilibrium behaves quite diﬀerently from that in Lucas’s model. In particular, µm and a are
no longer constants. Because the asset constraint binds in an unrestricted trade, the quantity of
goods in such a trade depends on the amount of unmatured bonds, as well as the money stock.
Since the amount of unmatured bonds in a period is equal to the quantity of new bonds issued
in the previous period, the quantity of goods in an unrestricted match depends on the realization
of the previous period’s shock, z−1 (see (3.4)). That is, the previous period’s shock aﬀects the
amount of liquidity in the current goods market. As a result, the current shadow values of the
two assets are functions of the previous shock (see (3.9) and (3.10)). Since these asset values
9As u ﬃcient condition is that the left-hand side of the equation is greater than the right-hand side when a =0 .
15aﬀect the allocation of money between the two markets, a is a function of z−1, even though the
shocks are independent over time.
The nominal interest rate now depends on both the current shock and the previous period’s
shock. Thus, nominal interest rates are serially correlated even though the shocks are independent
over time. Moreover, open market operations aﬀect the relative value of unmatured bonds to
money, and hence aﬀect the term structure of interest rates. Determining the equilibrium in this
case is not so much easier than in the case of dependent shocks. So, I will go directly to the
equilibrium with dependent shocks.
5. The Equilibrium with Dependent Shocks
I now study the equilibrium in which the shocks are dependent. All proofs are collected in
Appendix A. For various proofs I need to restrict attention to µm(.) ∈ V and a(.) ∈ A,w h e r eV




βωH]a n dA the set of continuous
functions whose values lie in [aL,a H]. Norm both V and A by the supnorm. In addition to some
restrictions described later in Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, the bounds satisfy:
0 <a L ≤ aH < 1, 0 < ωL ≤ ωH < ∞. (5.1)
By (2.17), ωL ≤ ωm(z) ≤ ωH for all z.
The ﬁrst task to determine the equilibrium is to solve for µm from (3.9) under a ﬁxed function
a(.). Denote the right-hand side of (3.9) as T(ωm;a,z−1) and deﬁne
TO(µm;a,z−1)=T(O(µm);a,z−1). (5.2)
Then, (3.9) requires µm to be the ﬁxed point of TO.Iw i l lﬁnd conditions under which TO is a
monotone, contraction mapping from V to V. Impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. D e n o t et h er e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nb yδ (c)=−cu00 (c)/u0 (c). Assume that (i)







is decreasing in c.
Part (i) of the assumption is suﬃcient for T(ωm;a,z−1)t ob ei n c r e a s i n gi nωm.P a r t( i i )i s
necessary and suﬃcient for T to be concave in ωm in each of the three segments (0,w 1), (w1,w 2),
and (w2,∞). Part (ii) is satisﬁed if, for example, the utility function exhibits constant relative
risk aversion. Figure 2 depicts T as a function of ωm.N o t i c et h a t∂T/∂ωm is larger at w1+t h a n
at w1-, and larger at w2+t h a na tw2-. Thus, T is not concave in the entire region (0,∞).
The mapping TO is monotone under part (i) in Assumption 1, because T(ωm;a,z−1)i s
increasing in ωm and because ωm = O(µm) is a monotone linear mapping of µm. However, TO
fails to satisfy the contraction mapping requirement when ωm is suﬃciently small. This is because
when ωm → 0, Q1,Q 2 → 0, in which case ∂T/∂ωm is inﬁnite. To ensure that TOis a contraction,
I impose a lower bound on ωm and hence an upper bound on ∂T/∂ωm.
16Denote Tω = ∂T(ωm;a,z−1)/∂ωm.S i n c eT is concave in ωm in each of the three segments,
Tω ≤ max{Tω(w1+;a,z−1),1} for all ωm ≥ w1. Also, because Tω(w1-;a,z−1) <T ω(w1+;a,z−1),
there exists w3 <w 1 such that for all ωm ≥ w3, Tω ≤ max{Tω(w1+;a,z−1),1}. Under (ii) of
Assumption 1, Tω(w1+;a,z−1) decreases in a and increases in z−1, after the dependence of w1 on
(a,z−1) is taken into account. Setting a = aL, z−1 = zH and w1 = w1(aL,z H), I have
Tω(w1+;a,z−1) ≤ ¯ Tω ≡ 1 − ασg +
ασg
Ψ





´ ,a l l( a,z−1),
where






I choose the upper bound on Tω as
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Figure 2
The upper bound K leads to a lower bound on ωm.L e tω0(a,z−1)( <w 1)s o l v eTω(ω0;a,z−1)=
K.B e c a u s eTω(ω;a,z−1) is decreasing in (ω,a,z −1), ω0 is decreasing in (a,z−1). The lower bound
of ωm is then deﬁned as ωL = ω0(aL,z L). Clearly, ωL is smaller if a larger κ is chosen (see Figure
2), and ωL > 0 for all ﬁnite κ. Also, for all ωm ≥ ωL,0<T ω ≤ K.
Lemma 5.1. Let ε > 0 be a small number. Given any function a(.) ∈ A, the mapping TO
deﬁned in (5.2) is a monotone contraction mapping from V to V if the following condition holds:
max{K + ε,F(ωH,a L,z L)+1 } ≤ γ/β ≤ F (ωL,a H,z H)+1 . (5.3)
Under this condition, TO has a unique ﬁxed point µm
a (.) ∈ V.
17The set of parameter values that satisfy (5.3) is nonempty. To see this, note that F(ωL,a H,z H) >
0 by construction. By choosing κ suﬃciently close to 1, I can ensure K +ε <F(ωL,a H,z H)+1.
Then, there are values of γ (> β)t h a ts a t i s f yK +ε ≤ γ/β ≤ F (ωL,a H,z H)+1. Finally, because
F(ω;a,z)=0w h e nω is large, I can choose a large value for ωH to ensure F (ωH,a L,z L)+1 ≤ γ/β.
Clearly, these conditions require γ > β and ωH > ωL.
The notation µm
a emphasizes the dependence of the ﬁxed point on the arbitrarily chosen
function a. Similarly, the expected future shadow value of money is ωm
a (z−1)=O(µm
a )(z−1)a n d
the shadow value of unmatured bonds is µb
a(.), obtained by substituting µm
a into (3.10). Clearly,
ωm
a (.)a n dµb
a(.) are continuous. Also, ωm
a (z) ∈ [ωL,ωH], all z ∈ Z.
The task now is to determine the equilibrium fraction of money in the goods market, a.
Substituting µm
a and µb
a into (3.11), I have a(z−1)=Γa(z−1), where












Since I required a ∈ A, the equilibrium satisﬁes this requirement only if Γa ∈ A.T h ef o l l o w i n g
lemma gives the suﬃcient conditions:
Lemma 5.2. Given any a ∈ A, Γa ∈ A if aH is close to one and if







The condition (5.5) is satisﬁed if zH and aL are small. This restriction on zH is necessary to
ensure that the households allocate a positive fraction of money to the goods market. If the size
of the open market operation were very large, instead, new bonds would be heavily discounted;
given that the money growth rate is ﬁxed, the households would allocate all the money to the
bonds market to obtain the discount.
In light of Lemma 5.2, I can interpret Γ as a mapping from A to A. Then, the equilibrium
function a is a ﬁxed point of Γ. Γ is continuous (see the proof of the following theorem in
Appendix A). Since A is compact and convex, Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem implies that Γ has
a ﬁxed point in A.T h i sﬁxed point is the equilibrium function a(.). Using this function in the
computation of µm
a (.)a n dµb
a(.), I can recover the shadow values of money and unmatured bonds.
The following theorem summarizes the above results.
Theorem 5.3. Maintain Assumption 1 and (5.1). Let (zH,a L) satisfy (5.5) and let aH be close
to 1.C h o o s e ( γ,K,ωH) to satisfy (5.3) and deﬁne ωL by Tω(ωL;aL,z L)=K. An equilibrium
exists, which satisﬁes µm(.) ∈ V, a(.) ∈ A,a n dωL ≤ ωm(z) ≤ ωH for all z ∈ Z.
Because the mapping that deﬁnes the function a is implicit, it is diﬃcult to check whether
the solution is monotone. Likewise, it is diﬃcult to check whether consumption is a monotonic
function of the past shock. To study equilibrium properties, I turn to numerical examples.
186. Numerical Examples





Let the shock z have two realizations, z1 and z2,w i t hz2 >z 1.R e f e r t o z2 as the high shock
and z1 as the low shock. The transition probability from zi to zi is θ and to zi0 (i0 6= i)i s1− θ,
i =1 ,2. Consider the following parameter values:
preference: δ =0 .5, u0 =4 ,ψ0 =1 ,Ψ =2 ,β =0 .995;
goods market: α =1 ,σ =0 .5, g =0 .2
monetary policy: z1 =0 .02, z2 =0 .08, γ =1 .005.
Ic h o o s eg to be the size of the government relative to the economy, using the interpretation
that the legal restriction in the goods market is imposed in trades between private households
and the government. The values of (β,z 1,z 2) are the ones chosen by Lucas (1990). With the
particular value of β, I can interpret the length of a period as one month and the interest rate
r as the bi-monthly interest rate. Also following Lucas, I explore a large range of values of θ:
0.01,0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9a n d0 .99.
Choose aL =0 .90, aH =0 .98, κ =1 ,ωL =0 .543 and ωH =3 .375. These parameter values
satisfy all conditions required for existence in Theorem 5.3. Moreover, the equilibrium lies in the
region ωm ∈ (0,w 1). That is, unmatured bonds generate liquidity in the goods market and the
household takes all unmatured bonds to the goods market.10
To display the results, let me add a subscript i to variables that depend only on the previous
period’s shock zi,w h e r ei =1 ,2. Add subscripts ji to variables that depend on both the current
shock zj and the previous period’s shock zi,w h e r ei,j =1 ,2. Table 1 describes equilibrium prop-
erties of the fraction of money taken to the bonds market (1−a), interest rates, consumption, the
quantities of goods in trades, the shadow values of assets and the term structure of interest rates.
The mean, the standard deviation, and serial autocorrelations are calculated using the unique
invariant measure prob(zi)=1 /2f o ri =1 ,2. Since goods have diﬀerent prices in unrestricted
trades and restricted trades, I compute aggregate real output (consumption) as follows:






where pg is the price of goods in a restricted trade, normalized by the money stock, and pn is
the normalized price in an unrestricted trade. The term structure of interest rates is represented
by the percentage diﬀerence between the yield to newly issued two-period bonds, S−1/2,a n dt h e
10This is the case for a large range of parameter values. In fact, the range (w1,w 2) 3 ω
m,i nw h i c hu n m a t u r e d
bonds do not generate liquidity service in the goods market, is very narrow.
19yield to one-period bonds, 1/SI. Letting rI be the one-period interest rate corresponding to SI










 × 100. (6.1)
Three results in Table 1 resemble those found by Lucas (1990). First, interest rates change
signiﬁcantly with the persistence of the shock when the current shock is high. Also, interest
rates have a large (unconditional) standard deviation. However, the mean of interest rates does
not vary signiﬁcantly with the persistence of the shock, even if the degree of persistence varies
between 0.1a n d0 .9. Thus, if one is interested only in the mean of interest rates, one can ignore
the persistence and simply examine the case of independent shocks (i.e., θ =0 .5).
Second, the fraction of money allocated to the bonds market is insensitive to the previous
period’s shock. As in Lucas’s model, this insensitivity is puzzling especially when the shocks are
negatively dependent. With negatively dependent shocks, a high shock in the previous period
implies that the amount of bond sales is likely to be low in the current period and the bond price
likely to be high. Since the discount on bonds will be small, there is not much need to allocate
more money to the bonds market to take advantage of the discount on new bonds. Thus, when
the shocks are negatively correlated, one would expect that the household would reduce (1 − a)
signiﬁcantly upon observing a high shock in the previous period. This does not happen in the
numerical examples.
The insensitivity is more puzzling here than in Lucas’s model, because the goods market
provides an additional reason for the household to adjust the money allocation signiﬁcantly. A
high past shock increases the amount of assets used in an unrestricted trade relative to the
assets in a restricted trade. This widens the gap between the quantities of goods obtained in the
two types of trades, and hence increases the variation in consumption. To smooth consumption
between the two types of trades, the household should increase the fraction of money allocated to
the goods market, so as to maintain a stable ratio of assets used in an unrestricted trade relative
to a restricted trade. Despite this additional reason, the negative response of (1 − a) to the past
shock is not signiﬁcant. Even when θ =0 .1, an increase of z−1 from z1 to z2 reduces (1−a)f r o m
7.83% to 7.65%. This reduction is small in comparison with the variation in the shock.
Third, the insensitivity of the money allocation leads to a strong liquidity eﬀect in the bonds
market, as measured by changes in nominal interest rates. Interest rates are signiﬁcantly higher
when the current shock is high than when the current shock is low; that is, r2i is much higher
than r1i for i =1 ,2. When the money allocation is insensitive, a higher supply of new bonds
must be absorbed by a fall in the bond price, resulting in a higher interest rate. Notice that,
when the current shock is low, the one-period interest rate is zero (see (2.22)) and the two-period
interest rate does not depend on past shocks. This is because there is more money than what is
20needed in the bonds market when the current shock is low.
Table 1. Simulation results
θ
0.01 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.99
1 − a1 (%) 7.84 7.827 7.789 7.722 7.578 7.003 3.923
1 − a2 (%) 6.17 7.646 7.852 7.890 7.900 7.885 7.863
r11 (%) 0.474 0.452 0.444 0.438 0.409 0.379 0.326
r12 (%) 0.474 0.452 0.444 0.438 0.409 0.379 0.326
r21 (%) 2.045 2.210 2.714 3.601 5.566 14.23 103.9
r22 (%) 29.66 4.632 1.884 1.392 1.261 1.454 1.736
E(r)( % ) 1.397 1.452 1.455 1.468 1.481 1.556 1.542
StD(r)( % ) 2.151 1.124 1.045 1.292 1.759 2.955 7.291
corr(r,r−1) -0.126 -0.461 -0.535 -0.341 -0.165 -0.028 0.004
corr(r,r−2) 0.124 0.368 0.214 0 -0.066 -0.023 0.004
corr(r,r−3) -0.121 -0.295 -0.086 0 -0.026 -0.018 0.004
c1 0.616 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.618 0.619 0.622
c2 0.627 0.627 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.625 0.622
E(c) 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.622
StD(c) 0.0058 0.0049 0.0047 0.0044 0.0041 0.0026 0.0002
corr(r,c) -0.294 -0.518 -0.533 -0.427 -0.270 -0.071 0.025
qn
1 2.469 2.472 2.473 2.474 2.476 2.482 2.492
qn
2 2.519 2.519 2.519 2.519 2.519 2.518 2.508
q
g
1 2.442 2.446 2.447 2.448 2.449 2.456 2.466
q
g
2 2.473 2.455 2.450 2.446 2.437 2.416 2.406
µm
1 3.293 3.298 3.299 3.298 3.294 3.285 3.197
µm
2 3.269 3.276 3.272 3.262 3.242 3.190 3.174
µb
1 3.277 3.283 3.284 3.247 3.246 3.273 3.187
µb
2 3.260 3.263 3.258 3.247 3.225 3.169 3.151
term11 (%) 0.236 0.226 0.222 0.219 0.204 0.189 0.163
term12 (%) 0.236 0.226 0.222 0.219 0.204 0.189 0.163
term21 (%) -0.726 -0.698 -0.906 -1.304 -2.167 -5.824 -29.47
term22 (%) -11.93 -1.854 -0.504 -0.235 -0.108 -0.069 -0.149
The model generates several results that are absent in Lucas (1990). I will describe these
results below for the case of independent shocks, since the contrasts with Lucas’s model are the
sharpest in this case.
First, open market operations have real eﬀects — A high shock in the previous period increases
current real output. The diﬀerence between output in the two realizations of the shock is about
0.7% of the mean. This real eﬀect arises because (unmatured) bonds generate liquidity in the
goods market. A high shock in the previous period increases the stock of unmatured bonds in
the current goods market. This allows a buyer to purchase a larger quantity of goods in an
unrestricted trade than if the previous period’s shock was low, i.e., qn
2 >q n
1. The presence of a
21larger quantity of nominal assets in the goods market also pushes up the price level and reduces




1. In the numerical examples,
the increase in qn dominates the decrease in qg, and so aggregate output rises.11
Second, a high past shock reduces the current interest rate when the current shock is high. In
contrast, past (independent) shocks in Lucas’s model do not aﬀect the current interest rate. To
explain this new eﬀect, recall that a high past shock increases the amount of unmatured bonds
circulating in the current goods market and increases the price level. The higher price level
reduces real values of both money and unmatured bonds. However, the real value of unmatured
bonds (µb) falls by less than does the real value of money (µm), because the increased amount of
unmatured bonds increases liquidity in unrestricted trades. (In fact, µb barely changes at all with
past shocks when shocks are independent.) Thus, the relative value of unmatured bonds to money
increases, which induces the households to allocate more money to purchase new bonds. When
the current shock is high, the additional money in the bonds market pushes up the bond price
and depresses the current interest rate. When the current shock is low, the additional money in
the bonds market does not aﬀect the current interest rate, as discussed above.
Third, the above eﬀects of past shocks on current activities induce the following correlations:
(i) Interest rates in two adjacent periods are negatively correlated; (ii) Contemporaneous output
and interest rates are negatively correlated; (iii) Output is positively correlated with lagged
interest rates (not reported in Table 1).12 These correlations arise because a shock in the previous
period increases the interest rate in the previous period, increases current output, and reduces
the current interest rate. Note that the negative contemporaneous correlation between output
and interest rates is −0.427, which is comparable with the sample value in the US data (see
Christiano et al., 1995). However, the positive correlation in (iii) is unrealistic.
Finally, the term structure of interest rates responds to open market operations. The yield
curve is negatively sloped when the current shock is high and positively sloped when the current
shock is low. In light of (6.1), this negative response of the yield curve to the current shock is
not surprising. For example, a high current shock increases the one-period interest rate; at the
same time, it reduces the expected future discount on unmatured bonds (µm/µb)b yg e n e r a t i n g
liquidity in next period’s goods market. Both eﬀects reduce the slope of the yield curve.
Moreover, the slope of the yield curve can depend on the previous period’s shock. When the
11Because consumption varies between the states of the shock, the real interest rate varies with the shock.
However, the real interest rate varies by less than the nominal interest rate does. Also, real output (consumption)
is serially correlated (not reported in Table 1). The coeﬃcient of correlation between current consumption and
k-period past consumption is equal to (2θ−1)
k. Thus, positively correlated shocks induce positive autocorrelations
in consumption.
12The formulas for the correlations between r and c are as follows:
corr(r, y)=
y2−y1
2 [θ(r22 − r11)+( 1− θ)(r12 − r21)],
corr(r, y+1)=
y2−y1
2 [θ(r22 − r11)+( 1− θ)(r21 − r12)].
Moreover, corr(r, y−j)=( 2 θ − 1)
jcorr(r, y)a n dcorr(r,y+j)=( 2 θ − 1)
j−1corr(r,y+1), for j =1 ,2,....
22current shock is high, a high past shock makes the yield curve less negatively sloped. To explain
this result, recall that a high past shock increases the money allocation to the current bonds
market. This higher money allocation reduces current interest rates when the current shock is
high. However, the expected future discount on unmatured bonds depends only on the current
shock, not on past shocks. Thus, by (6.1), the yield curve becomes less negatively sloped.13
Clearly, the role of unmatured bonds in the goods market is important for this dependence of the
yield curve on past shocks, because it is the reason why the households condition their money
allocation on past shocks. In contrast, in Lucas’s model, bonds play no role in the goods market
regardless of the maturity, and so the yield curve is independent of past shocks when the shocks
are independent.
Most of the above features with independent shocks continue to exist when shocks are de-
pendent. However, there are a few changes. First, when shocks are highly negatively dependent
(i.e., θ ≤ 0.1), a high past shock increases (rather than decreases) the current interest rate when
the current shock is high. That is, r22 >r 21. This is because, given the high past shock and the
negative serial dependence, the households anticipate bond sales to be low in the current period
and so they allocate less money to the bonds market. When the current bond sales turn out to be
high, the interest rate will be high. Second, when the shocks are highly persistent (i.e., θ ≥ 0.99),
the correlation between the current and one-period past interest rates becomes positive. This is
not surprising because a permanent shock will generate a positive correlation between interest
rates in all periods. Similarly, the contemporaneous correlation between output and interest rates
becomes positive when the shocks are highly persistent.
Table 2 reports the results of the sensitivity analysis. In this analysis, shocks are independent
and I perturb the money growth rate (γ), the scope of the legal restriction (g), the relative
risk aversion (δ) and the variation in the shock. These perturbations have small eﬀects on real
variables but large eﬀects on the nominal interest rate.
First, an increase in the money growth rate increases the mean of interest rates and reduces
the mean of real consumption (output); it also increases the standard deviations of interest rates
and real output. By eliminating net money growth from the baseline case, the mean and standard
deviation of interest rates fall by about a half, and the standard deviation in output falls by more
than a half. Real output and the nominal interest rate are still negatively correlated with each
other but the magnitude seems to ﬁrst increase, and then decrease, with money growth.
Second, an increase in the scope of the legal restriction increases the mean of interest rates
but aﬀects the standard deviation of interest rates in a hump-shaped pattern. The mean of real
consumption barely changes with the increase in the scope of the legal restriction, the standard
deviation of consumption decreases, and the negative correlation between consumption and in-
13Of course, when the current shock is low, the one-period interest rate is zero and unaﬀected by the money
allocation , in which case the slope of the yield curve is independent of past shocks.
23terest rates weakens. Real consumption responds in this way because the wider coverage of the
legal restriction reduces the liquidity eﬀect of unmatured bonds in the current goods market and
reduces the variation in the quantity of goods between a restricted trade and an unrestricted
trade. Because consumption varies less and interest rates vary more between diﬀerent states, the
two variables become less correlated with each other.
Table 2. Sensitivity results
z1 =0 .001
baseline γ =1 γ =1 .05 g =0 .01 g =0 .5 δ =0 .05 z2 =0 .099
1 − a1 (%) 7.722 7.863 6.983 7.688 7.749 7.720 9.542
1 − a2 (%) 7.890 7.932 7.216 8.000 7.807 7.895 9.794
E(r)( % ) 1.468 0.788 7.024 1.038 1.826 1.435 1.375
StD(r)( % ) 1.292 0.601 5.839 0.012 1.062 1.320 1.404
corr(r,r−1) -0.341 -0.314 -0.154 -0.331 -0.175 -0.343 -0.352
c1 0.617 0.624 0.581 0.614 0.620 0.502 0.616
c2 0.626 0.627 0.594 0.629 0.623 0.513 0.627
E(c) 0.622 0.626 0.588 0.622 0.622 0.507 0.622
StD(c) 0.0044 0.0018 0.0066 0.0079 0.0015 0.0056 0.0052
corr(r,c) -0.427 -0.368 -0.158 -0.581 -0.181 -0.434 -0.474
term11 (%) 0.219 0.137 0.665 0.021 0.399 0.196 0.166
term12 (%) 0.219 0.137 0.665 0.021 0.399 0.196 0.166
term21 (%) -1.304 -0.581 -5.259 -1.966 -0.778 -1.335 -1.471
term22 (%) -0.235 -0.147 -3.693 0.003 -0.407 -0.225 -0.181
Baseline parameters: θ =0 .5, γ =1 .005, g =0 .2, δ =0 .5, z1 =0 .02, z2 =0 .08, θ =0 .5.
Third, a decrease in the relative risk aversion reduces the mean and increases the variation
in interest rates. It also reduces the mean of output, increases the variation in output, and
strengthens the negative correlation between output and the nominal interest rate. A remarkable
feature is that the allocation of money between the two markets remains very insensitive to the
previous period’s shock even when the utility function is almost linear (i.e., when δ =0 .05). This
i sn o taf e a t u r es p e c i a lt ot h ec a s eo fi n d e p e n d e n ts h o c k s ;i ta l s oo c c u r sw h e ns h o c k sa r eh i g h l y
persistent, e.g., when θ =0 .99.
Fourth, an increase in the mean-preserving spread in the shock reduces the mean and increases
the variation in interest rates. It also increases the variation in output, without aﬀecting the mean
of output much, and strengthens the negative correlation between output and the interest rate.
Finally, the above changes in the parameter values change the magnitude of the slope of the
yield curve but have very little eﬀect on the sign of the slope. Not surprisingly, when the scope
of the legal restriction becomes very narrow (g =0 .01), the yield curve becomes very ﬂat in most
cases. When g → 1, the equilibrium approaches the one analyzed by Lucas (1990).
247. Conclusion
In this paper I combine a decentralized goods market and a centralized bonds market to analyze
the liquidity eﬀects of open market operations. The bonds market features limited participation,
while the goods market features bilateral matches. In a fraction of trades, a legal restriction
forbids the use of bonds as the means of payments for goods. In such a restricted trade, the
buyer faces a money constraint. In an unrestricted trade, the buyer can use both money and
unmatured bonds to buy goods, and so unmatured bonds can provide liquidity. A shock to bond
sales in this economy has two distinct liquidity eﬀects. One is the immediate liquidity eﬀect in
the bonds market, as emphasized by Lucas (1990), and the other is a liquidity eﬀect in the goods
market starting one period later.
The liquidity eﬀect in the bonds market arises because there is limited participation in the
bonds market and because the households’ money allocation between the markets is insensitive
to past shocks, even when shocks are highly persistent. With this insensitive money allocation,
the bond price and hence the nominal interest rate absorbs most of the shock to current bond
sales. This liquidity eﬀect is short-lived, as in Lucas’s model.
The liquidity eﬀect in the goods market is new and it occurs with a delay.14 For example,
a high shock to bond sales in the previous period increases the amount of unmatured bonds
circulating in the current goods market, relaxes the asset constraints in unrestricted trades, and
hence increases the quantity of goods traded in an unrestricted trade relative to that in a restricted
trade. Important for this liquidity eﬀect is the temporary separation between trades in the goods
market, implied by random matches. If all exchanges in the goods market were centralized in the
Walrasian style, then a high past shock would simply push up the price level without aﬀecting
real output. In contrast with the liquidity eﬀect in the bonds market, the liquidity eﬀect in the
goods market can be long-lived and, in principle, the duration of this eﬀect increases with the
length of maturity of the bonds that are used in open market operations.15
The liquidity eﬀect of unmatured bonds in the goods market generates a number of new fea-
tures. These features are best illustrated in the case of independent shocks. First, a high shock
to bond sales in the previous period leads to higher current output by increasing liquidity in the
current goods market. This also implies that the real interest rate varies with past shocks. Sec-
ond, the shock in the previous period aﬀects the current interest rate by changing the allocation
of money between the two markets. In particular, a high past shock reduces the relative value of
money to unmatured bonds and increases the amount of money allocated to the current bonds
14A popular variation of Lucas’s model assumes that there is a separate cash-in-advance constraint on ﬁrms’
wage payment and that open market operations aﬀect ﬁrms’ available funds before aﬀecting the price level (e.g.,
Fuerst 1992). This variation allows open market operations to aﬀect real activities, but such real eﬀects are quite
diﬀerent from the liquidity eﬀe c ti nt h eg o o d sm a r k e tt h a tIe m p h a s i z eh e r e .
15If the government attaches repurchase agreementst ob o n ds a l e s ,t h e nt h ed u r a t i o no ft h el i q u i d i t ye ﬀect of
b o n d si nt h eg o o d sm a r k e tw i l lb er e d u c e d .
25market, which reduces the current nominal interest rate. Third, because of the last two features,
the contemporaneous correlation between interest rates and output is negative, and the auto-
correlation between interest rates in two adjacent periods is negative. Finally, past and current
shocks both aﬀect the slope of the yield curve. In particular, when the current shock is high, the
yield curve is negatively sloped and it is more so when the previous period’s shock was low.
Another way to understand this set of new features is that the goods market eliminates the
“one-factor” character of Lucas’s model. Although money and bonds of diﬀerent maturities are
traded in the same centralized market, the liquidity services generated by these assets in the
goods market are diﬀerent, depending on the lengths of maturity and the dependence of shocks.
Open market operations aﬀect the relative value between these assets and, especially, between
unmatured bonds and money. This eﬀect leads to the re-allocation of money between diﬀerent
m a r k e t s ,w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects real output and generates the serial correlation in interest rates.
In order to focus on the liquidity eﬀects, I have retained several assumptions in Lucas’s model.
First, open market operations do not aﬀect money growth. Second, there is no element (other
than the one-period separation between markets) to delay the transmission of shocks from the
bonds market to the goods market. Third, the shock to bond sales is the only shock in the
economy. Relaxing these assumptions might improve the predictions of the model. For example,
the current model generates the unrealistic result that future output is positively correlated with
the current interest rate. This result might be overturned if there are money demand shocks
as well as the shocks in open market operations. One example of a money demand shock is
stochastic changes in the scope of the legal restriction, g.
Finally, there may be a need to model explicitly how ﬁnancial institutions turn unmatured
bonds into instruments that can circulate in the goods market temporarily. Such an explicit role
of intermediation may produce a more realistic mechanism of monetary propagation.
26Appendix
A. Proofs of Lemmas 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3
Consider Lemma 5.1. First, TO maps from V to V. For any µm ∈ V, O(µm) is continuous
because Φ has the Feller property. Since a(.) ∈ A is continuous, TO(µm) is continuous. Because
µm ≥
γ
βωL,t h e nO(µm) ≥ ωL. Hence,
TO(µm) ≥ ωL [1 + F (ωL;a,z−1)] ≥ ωL [1 + F (ωL;aH,z H)].
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that T is an increasing function of ωm and the second
inequality from the fact that, for given ωm, F(ωm;a,z−1) is a decreasing function of (a,z−1).
Similarly, O(µm) ≤ ωH and









F (ωH,a L,z L)+1≤ γ/β ≤ F (ωL,a H,z H)+1 .
This is part of the condition (5.3) in the lemma.
Second, TO is a contraction under the supnorm. Take any µ0,µ 00 ∈ V.L e t ω0 = O(µ0)a n d
ω00 = O(µ00). Then, ω0,ω00 ≥ ωL and
¯ ¯ω0 − ω00¯ ¯ =




° °µ0 − µ00° °.
Because T is concave in each of its segments and because Tω is bounded above by K for all
ωm ≥ ωL,Ih a v e :
¯ ¯T(ω0) − T(ω00)
¯ ¯ ≤ K





° °µ0 − µ00° °.
Thus, kTO(µ0) − TO(µ00)k ≤
β
γK kµ0 − µ00k. The mapping TO is a contraction if γ/β ≥ K + ε,
where ε > 0. This condition is part of the condition (5.3) in the lemma.
Because TO: V → V is a contraction mapping under (5.3), and V (with the supnorm) is a
complete metric space, TO has a unique ﬁxed point µm
a ∈ V.
Now turn to Lemma 5.2. Since (µm
a ,µ b
a) are continuous, µm
a ≥
γ
βωL > 0, and Φ has the
Feller property, then Γa(.)d e ﬁned by (5.4) is continuous. To show Γa ∈ A,i ts u ﬃces to show
Γa(z) ∈ [aL,a H] for all z ∈ Z. Notice that the right-hand side of (5.4) is increasing in a(z−1)f o r
given (µm
a ,µ b





























The ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed when aH is close to 1. For the second condition, note that µb
a(z) ≤
µm
























27Then, a suﬃcient condition for (A.2) is
µm





















a ,a,z −1)a n dF is a decreasing function of its three arguments, a suﬃcient
condition for the above condition is (5.5).




a as functions of a.I s h o w t h a t ( µm
a ,µ b
a,ωm
a ) are continuous in a in the supnorm. Once




a ) to be continuous in a are similar, I describe only the proof for µm
a .F o r t h e




° ° < ε whenever
ka2 − a1k < ∆, where the norm is the supnorm. Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary number. Deﬁne
B(ωm,z −1)=m a x
a,b a∈A
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
F(ωm,a(z−1),z −1) − F(ωm,b a(z−1),z −1)
b a(z−1) − a(z−1)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯,
where F is deﬁn e di n( 3 . 8 ) . S i n c eF is decreasing in a, B>0. Also, because the intervals
[aL,a H],[ωL,ωH], and [zL,z H] are bounded away from zero and bounded above, it can be veriﬁed
that B(ωm,z −1) < ∞. For any a1,a 2 ∈ A,i fka2 − a1k < ∆,t h e n
|F(ωm,a 2(z−1),z −1) − F(ωm,a 1(z−1),z −1)|
≤ B(ωm,z −1)|a2(z−1) − a1(z−1)| ≤ B(ωm,z −1)ka2 − a1k <B (ωm,z −1)∆.
Because T(ωm,a,z −1)=ωm (1 + F)a n dωm ≤ ωH,t h e n
|T(ωm,a 2(z−1),z −1) − T(ωm,a 1(z−1),z −1)|
= ωm |F(ωm,a 2(z−1),z −1) − F(ωm,a 1(z−1),z −1)| < ωHB(ωm,z −1)∆.
Since µm
a = T(ωm
a ,a(z−1),z −1)a n dkTO(µ0) − TO(µ00)k ≤
β
γK kµ0 − µ00k, I get:
¯ ¯µm




































° ° + ωHB(ωm
a1(z−1),z −1)∆.
















[ωH kBk]. Because γ/β >K , kBk < ∞ and 0 < ωH < ∞,t h e n∆ > 0.




° ° < ε. QED
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